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Abstract All existing quantum oblivious transfer protocols are to realize the
oblivious transfer of bit or bit-string. In this paper, p-Rabin quantum oblivious
transfer of a qubit (abbr. p-Rabin qubit-OT) is achieved by using a probabilis-
tic teleportation (abbr. PT) protocol. Here, this is the first time that the
concept of qubit-OT is presented. As the PT protocol is able to transfer an
(un)known pure state with a certain probability, this feature makes the PT
protocol well fit for Rabin OT. Furthermore, the PT protocol can be used for
OT of a bit by encoding classical bit with two pre-agreed orthogonal states. Fi-
nally, security analysis shows that the PT protocol can be against participants
attacks, and what’s more, the discussion of relationship with no-go theorem
demonstrates that the PT protocol is able to evade the no-go theorem.
Keywords p-Rabin oblivious transfer · probabilistic teleportation · security
analysis · no-go theorem
PACS 03.67.Dd · 03.67.Hk
1 Introduction
Oblivious transfer(OT), firstly introduced by Rabin[1], is an important prim-
itive in cryptography, in particular two-party computation. There are two
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major types of OT: Rabin OT (often referred to as all-or-nothing OT) and
1-out-of-2 OT. In Rabin OT, a sender (named Alice) wants to send a one-bit
message s to a receiver (named Bob) in such a way that Bob learns s with
probability 1/2 at the end of the protocol. Alice does not know whether Bob
receives the s or not, but Bob knows. In 1-out-of-2 OT, Alice sends two one-bit
messages m0 and m1 to Bob, and Bob can choose one of the messages but not
knowing the other one, while Alice doesn’t know Bob’s choice. Later, these
two OT protocols are shown to be equivalent in classical level [2].
As summarized in [3], realization methods of Quantum OT(QOT) can be
roughly classified into 5 types:
(1) PR non-locality box[4,5,6].
(2) Cre´peau’s reduction [7,8,9,10,11]
(3) QBC-based QOT. Because of MLC no-go theorem[12,13], uncondi-
tional secure bit commitment is impossible within the scope of non-relativistic
physics, which makes researchers try other ways to circumvent the no-go the-
orem. Later, based on relativistic, several unconditional secure BC protocols
are proposed [14,15,16] and demonstrated experimentally [17,18]. So now here
comes the question, could unconditional secure QBC lead to secure QOT? The
analysis of He[19] shows that the answer is not completely negative: some of
the no-go proofs remain valid, while some other no-go proofs no longer work.
As a result, this open question needs more attention.
(4) bit-string QOT. In 2015, based on quantum state computational dis-
tinguishability [20], Souto et. al.[21,22] presented a bit-string OT, which is
pointed out unsuitable for reduction to 1-out-of-2 OT using Cre´peau’s reduction[2]
by He[23] and Plesch et.al.[24]. The main reason is that if the sender Alice
cheats, the receiver Bob doesn’t know that Alice also knows that Bob doesn’t
get the bit-string. Moreover, Plesch et.al.[24] introduces an improved reduc-
tion that is appropriate for some flawed protocols such as [21] converting to
1-out-of-2 OT.
(5) Practical QOT[25,26,27,28]. The practical QOT protocols are based on
some difficult problems, such as computational hard problems, technological
limitations and so on.
As far as all-or-nothing QOT protocols are concerned, the first all-or-
nothing QOT was proposed by Cre´peau and Kilian in 1988[29]. Damgard et
al. proposed an efficient, non-interactive and secure all-or-nothing QOT in a
bounded quantum storage model[26]. To make Damgards protocol tolerate the
loss and error in both of quantum channel and measurements, the secret bit is
covered by a correctable string in Lis protocol[27]. In 2015, an all-or-nothing
bit-string QOT was presented, under the assumption of quantum hardness of
state distinguishability and the constraint of performing at most few-qubit
measurements[21]. In the same year, another all-or-nothing QOT of a bit is
proposed with relatively few quantum resources for the receiver[10]. Joa˜o pro-
posed an all-or-nothing bit-string QOT. Based on it, an all-or-nothing QOT
of a bit is derived[28]. The following two protocols utilize entangled states. An
all-or-nothing QOT is proposed by using n 4-qubit entangled states, and its
security can be achieved if the n is large enough[30]. Under the assistance of
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an untrusted third party, Yang et al. proposed a secure all-or-nothing QOT
[8].
All QOT protocols mentioned above are OT of a classical bit or a classical
bit-string. In our knowledge, there is no related research about OT of a qubit
yet. We find that the PT protocol[31] fits for the definition of all-or-nothing
OT very well. And the security analysis shows that the PT protocol can be
indeed used to achieved p-Rabin OT of a qubit.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 firstly introduces a
typical PT protocol. Then its application in p-Rabin qubit-OT is illustrated.
The security of the application is analyzed in Section 3. Finally, a conclusion
is drawn in Section 4.
2 Probabilistic teleportation protocol and its application in
p-Rabin qubit-oblivious transfer
2.1 a typical probabilistic teleportation protocol
In[31], a protocol for PT of a qubit is presented using a partially entangled
state. An (un)known qubit can be transmitted from a sender (Alice) to a
receiver (Bob) via a quantum channel and LOCC. Suppose that Alice and
Bob share a partially entangled pair
|φ〉AB = a|00〉AB + b|11〉AB, (|a|2 + |b|2 = 1, |a| > |b|) (1)
where Alice has particle A and Bob has particle B. Alice has a qubit C in
pure state |ζ〉C = α|0〉+ β|1〉 (|α|2 + |β|2 = 1) that will be teleported to Bob.
Then the combined three particle system can be described as
|φ〉CAB = (αa|000〉+ αb|011〉+ βa|100〉+ βb|111〉)CAB (2)
Using the Bell state basis, |φ〉CAB can be rewrote as
|φ〉CAB = 1√
2
[
|ψ1〉CA(αa|0〉+ βb|1〉))B + |ψ2〉CA(αa|0〉 − βb|1〉))B
+ |ψ3〉CA(βa|0〉+ αb|1〉))B + |ψ3〉CA(βa|0〉 − αb|1〉))B
] (3)
where the four Bell states are
|ψ1〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉), |ψ2〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉),
|ψ3〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉), |ψ4〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉).
(4)
The specific steps of the PT protocol are described as follows.
Protocol 1 (A typical probabilistic teleportation protocol [31])
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Step 1 Alice performs a joint Bell measurement(BM) on particles C and
A. The possible BM results, occurring probabilities and the corresponding col-
lapsed states of particle B are shown in Table 1.
Step 2 Alice sends the result of BM to Bob.
Step 3 Bob first introduces an auxiliary qubit with the initial state |δ〉m =
|0〉m. If the BM result is |ψi〉 (i = 1, 2, 3, 4), an optimal 2-qubit unitary operator
Ui is applied on system B,m, taking the state
1√
Pri
|φi〉B|0〉m to |φδi〉Bm given
by
|φδi〉Bm =
{ 1√
2Pr1
[
b(α|0〉+ β|1〉)B |0〉m +
√
1− 2|b|2α|0〉B|1〉m
]
, (i = 1, 2)
1√
2Pr3
[
b(α|0〉+ β|1〉)B |0〉m +
√
1− 2|b|2β|0〉B|1〉m
]
, (i = 3, 4).
(5)
Then Bob measures particle m using Z basis. If the measurement result is
|0〉m, particle B collapses to the teleported state |ζ〉B = α|0〉+β|1〉. Therefore,
Bob successfully recovers the teleported state with probability of 2|b|2.
Table 1 The BM results and occurring probabilities and the corresponding collapsed states
of particle B
BM result |ψ1〉 |ψ2〉 |ψ3〉 |ψ4〉
Pri
1
2
[
|αa|2 + |βb|2
]
1
2
[
|αa|2 + |βb|2
]
1
2
[
|βa|2 + |αb|2
]
1
2
[
|βa|2 + |αb|2
]
|φi〉B
1√
2Pr1
(αa|0〉 + βb|1〉) 1√
2Pr2
(αa|0〉 − βb|1〉) 1√
2Pr3
(βa|0〉+ αb|1〉) 1√
2Pr4
(βa|0〉 − αb|1〉)
Ui U1 U2 U3 U4
Prsuc
1
2
|b|2 1
2
|b|2 1
2
|b|2 1
2
|b|2
Prfail
1
2
|α|2(1 − 2|b|2) 1
2
|α|2(1 − 2|b|2) 1
2
|β|2(1− 2|b|2) 1
2
|β|2(1− 2|b|2)
The unitary transformations Ui (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) in Table 1 are given as
U1 =
[
A(a, b) 0
0 σz
]
, U2 =
[
A(a, b) 0
0 −σz
]
U3 =
[
0 σz
A(a, b) 0
]
, U4 =
[
0 −σz
A(a, b) 0
] (6)
where 0 is the 2 × 2 zero matrix, σz is the phase-flip operator, and A(a, b) is
the 2× 2 matrix relative to the parameters a and b of Equ. 1. σz and A(a, b)
are expressed as
σz =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
A(a, b) =

 ba
√
1− |b|2|a|2√
1− |b|2|a|2 − ba

 (7)
The four Ui(i = 1, 2, 3, 4) satisfy the following property
U1 = V1U2 = V2U3 = V3U4, (8)
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where V1, V2 and V3 are given by
V1 =
[
I 0
0 −I
]
V2 =
[
0 I
I 0
]
V3 =
[
0 I
−I 0
]
; and I =
[
1 0
0 1
]
(9)
Lema 1 For the receiver Bob, Protocol. 1 provides an optimal strategy to ex-
tract the teleported state and the maximal probability of successfully extracting
the teleported qubit is 2|b|2 [32].
2.2 An novel application of the Protocol. 1
Another description of Protocol. 1 to fit for the p-Rabin qubit-OT is given as
follows. Qubit to transfer: |ζ〉C = α|0〉+ β|1〉 (|α|2 + |β|2 = 1).
Quantum channel: |φ〉AB = a|00〉+ b|11〉, (|a|2+ |b|2 = 1, |a| > |b|). The
coefficients a and b only affect the probability of Bob’s receiving the transferred
qubit, so there is no need to keep them secret.
Step 1 Alice and Bob securely share a partially entangled pairs |φ〉AB.
Step 2 Using |φ〉AB as quantum channel, Alice teleports |ζ〉C to Bob by
implementing Protocol. 1 .
Step 3 Bob will recover |ζ〉B in particle B with probability of 2|b|2.
The above description illustrates that the Protocol. 1 fits the definition
of OT very well. Moreover, p-Rabin bit-OT can also be achieved by simply
encoding classical bits 0 and 1 with two orthogonal qubits such as |+〉 and |−〉.
However, the orthogonal basis {|0〉, |1〉} cannot be used to encode classical bits
0 and 1. According to Table 1, if the |ζ〉C is |0〉, i.e. α = 1 and β = 0 , the
state received by Bob is |0〉 when Alice’s BM result is |ψ1〉 or |ψ2〉, or |1〉 when
Alice’s BM result is |ψ3〉 or |ψ4〉. Therefore, Bob can recover the transferred
qubit with probability 1 by applying Pauli operator I orX according to Alice’s
BM results. Similarly, if the |ζ〉C is |1〉, i.e. α = 0 and β = 1, Bob can also
recover the transferred qubit with probability 1.
For the clarity of description, the term p-Rabin qubit-OT protocol is used
to replace Protocol. 1 in the following sections.
3 Security analysis of the p-Rabin qubit-OT protocol
In this section, we analyze the security of the p-Rabin qubit-OT protocol (i.e.
Protocol. 1). With reference to the requirements of p-Rabin bit-OT [2], the
p-Rabin qubit-OT should satisfy the following four properties(the first express
the correctness while the last three assure the security of the protocol):
Soundness: If Alice and Bob are both honest, then Bob will obtain the right
message with probability p. While Bob knows whether he gets the right
message or not, Alice is oblivious of the fact.
Concealingness: If Alice is honest, Bob cannot learn the right message
before the opening phase.
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Probabilistic transfer: After opening phase, Bob cannot learn the right
message with probability greater than p.
Oblivious: If Bob is honest, after the opening phase Alice must not know
with certainty whether Bob received the right message or not.
(A) Soundness
It’s clear that the p-Rabin qubit-OT protocol fulfills the soundness criterion
while the probability p = 2|b|2. As the coefficients a and b are related to the
probability, it’s important to make sure the correctness of the shared quantum
channel |φ〉AB . If the quantum channel and classical channel between Alice
and Bob are both authenticated, the securely sharing of |φ〉AB can be simply
realized as follows.
(1) In order to pre-share n entangled states of |φ〉AB , Alice prepares n+m
|φ〉AB and separates them into two sequences SA and SB. Both of them include
n+m particles.
(2) Alice randomly inserts k decoy states to SB to get S
′
B and sends S
′
B to
Bob.
(3) After Bob receives the S′B, Alice publishes the locations and encoding
basis of the decoy states. Then Bob checks the decoy states to prevent attacks
from the quantum channel. If there are no attacks from the channel, Bob is
able to recover SB.
(4) Bob randomly chooses m locations and asks Alice to send the cor-
responding qubis in SA to him. Then Bob measures the corresponding m
|φ〉AB with the orthogonal basis of (|η1〉, |η2〉, |η3〉, |η4〉), where |η1〉 = |φ〉AB ,
|η2〉 = b|00〉 − a|11〉, |η3〉 = a|01〉 + b|11〉, |η4〉 = b|01〉 − a|11〉. All the mea-
surement results should be |φ〉AB, or else attacks exist in the channel or Alice
may cheat. As a result, the above process of sharing quantum channel repeats
again.
It’s a more complicated case if Alice and Bob are strangers, i.e. there is no
authenticated channels between them. An quantum entanglement establish-
ment protocol is proposed to solve the case[34].
(B) Concealingness
In the p-Rabin qubit-OT protocol, the opening phase corresponds to Step
2 in Protocol. 1, i.e. Alice’s sending the BM result to Bob. Before receiving the
BM result from Alice, Bob’s state |φ〉B is in a mixed state {Pri, |φi〉B}(i =
1, 2, 3, 4) shown in Table 1. Bob’s state can also be represented by the density
matrix
ρB =
4∑
i=1
Pri|φi〉B〈φi| =
[|a|2 0
0 |b|2
]
(10)
which gives no information about the right state.
(C) Probabilistic transfer
After opening phase, Bob learns the exact state of his particle B. For
example, if Alice notices Bob that her measurement result is |ψ2〉, then Bob
knows that his particle is in the state |φ2〉B = 1√
2Pr2
(αa|0〉−βb|1〉). According
to Lema 1, for Bob, the maximal probability of successfully extracting the
right qubit is p = 2|b|2.
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Note that if the OT of the same qubit repeats n times, the probability
of successfully extracting the qubit is given by 1 − (1 − 2|b|2)n. The proba-
bility increases with the increase of n, so there is no reason for Bob to ask
Alice to retransfer the qubit. If there exists some external factors that affect
the correctness of the received qubit, such as loss and noise occurring in the
channel, tamper from attackers, some techniques should be used to overcome
these factors. For example, error correction can be used against the loss and
noise occurring in the channel and the tamper can be detected by using decoy
technique.
(D) Oblivious
Now we prove that the p-Rabin qubit-OT protocol is oblivious: Alice does
not know whether Bob received the right qubit or not. Note that Alice’s attacks
shouldn’t lead to the result that Bob will not be able to know of receiving the
right state with certainty, as it violates the original intention of OT.
If Alice launches attacks after Bell state measurement, because of Bob’s
performing only local operations and measurements, Alice has no way of know-
ing Bob’s measurement result of his auxiliary qubit. But there is still a case
that needs to be taken into account: in the opening phase, if Alice tells Bob a
fake BM result, the probability of successful OT would decrease or not. Sup-
pose that Alice’s BM result is |ψi〉 and the state of qubit B collapses to |φi〉B,
but she tells a fake one |ψj〉(j 6= i) to Bob. After receiving the fake message,
Bob applies Uj on particle B, i.e. Uj |φi〉B|0〉m. According to Equ.8 and 9, we
can derive a matrix W , the element Wji(j, i = 1, 2, 3, 4) of which is used to
describe the relationship between Uj and Ui, i.e. Uj =WjiUi.
W =


I V1 V2 V3
V1 I V1V2 V1V3
V2 V2V1 I V2V3
−V3 −V3V1 −V3V2 I

 (11)
Therefore, Uj |φi〉B|0〉m = WjiUi|φi〉B|0〉m, then Bob gets Wji|φδi〉Bm, where
|φδi〉Bm is shown in Equ.5. For example, i = 2, j = 3, i.e. Wji =W32 = V2V1,
then Bob gets the following state
W32|φδ2〉Bm = V2V1 1√
2Pr1
[
b(α|0〉+ β|1〉)B |0〉m +
√
1− 2|b|2α|0〉B|1〉m
]
=
1√
2Pr1
[
b(−β|0〉+ α|1〉)B|0〉m +
√
1− 2|b|2α|1〉B |1〉m
]
.
(12)
Thus, when Bob’s measurement result of particle m is |0〉, qubit B collapses
to −β|0〉 + α|1〉. Bob believes that he recovers a right quantum message but
actually not, which violates the original intention of OT.
Next, we consider the following two cases that the attacks are to launch
before the Bell measurement. Before the Bell measurement, Alice can launch
two types of attacks that may be able to know whether Bob would receive the
right qubit at the end of the protocol.
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The first possible attack is the unitary operation attack in which Alice
applies an unitary operator UA on particle A before Bell measurement. By
this attack, Alice hopes that she can control the probability of Bob’s successful
extraction of the right qubit.
Let UA = k1I+k2X+k3Z+k4iY , where I,X, Z, iY are Pauli operators[33]
which can connect the four Bell states. The detail relations are shown in Ta-
ble 2.
Table 2 The relations between Pauli matrices and Bell states
|ψ1〉 |ψ2〉 |ψ3〉 |ψ4〉
I |ψ1〉 |ψ2〉 |ψ3〉 |ψ4〉
X |ψ3〉 |ψ4〉 |ψ1〉 |ψ2〉
Z |ψ2〉 |ψ1〉 −|ψ4〉 −|ψ3〉
iY |ψ4〉 |ψ3〉 −|ψ2〉 −|ψ1〉
According to Equ. 3, |φ〉ABC =
∑
4
i=1 |ψi〉CA|φi〉B. By applying UA on
particle A of |φ〉ABC , the state of the tripartite system ABC becomes
|Λ〉 = UA|φ〉ABC =
4∑
i=1
(UA|ψi〉CA)|φi〉B
= (k1|ψ1〉+ k2|ψ3〉+ k3|ψ2〉+ k4i|ψ4〉)CA|φ1〉B
+(k1|ψ2〉+ k2|ψ4〉+ k3|ψ1〉+ k4i|ψ3〉)CA|φ2〉B
+(k1|ψ3〉+ k2|ψ1〉 − k3|ψ4〉 − k4i|ψ2〉)CA|φ3〉B
+(k1|ψ4〉+ k2|ψ2〉 − k3|ψ3〉 − k4i|ψ1〉)CA|φ4〉B (13)
According to Equ. 13, suppose that Alice’s BM result is |ψ1〉, particle B col-
lapses to
|φ′〉B = 1√
2
[
(k1 + k3)α+ (k2 + k4i)β
]
a|0〉+ 1√
2
[
(k1 − k3)β + (k2 − k4i)α
]
b|1〉
△
= δ1a|0〉+ δ2b|1〉 (14)
After receiving Alice’s BM result, Bob performs U1 on |φ′〉B |0〉m and get δ1|0〉+
δ2|1〉 with probability 12 |b|2. Bob believes that he receives a right quantum
message but actually not, which violates the original intention of OT.
The other possible attack is entanglement-measure attack in which Alice
entangles an auxiliary qubit E with particle A.
|Γ 〉 = CNOTAE |φ〉ABC |0〉E
= (αa|0000〉+ αb|0111〉+ βa|1000〉+ βb|1111〉)CABE
=
1√
2
[
|ψ1〉CA(αa|00〉+ βb|11〉))BE + |ψ2〉CA(αa|00〉 − βb|11〉))BE
+|ψ3〉CA(βa|00〉+ αb|1〉))BE + |ψ3〉CA(βa|00〉 − αb|11〉))BE
]
(15)
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Here, CNOTAE is the controlled NOT gate, where A is the control qubit
and E is the target qubit. Without loss of generality, suppose that Alice’s
BM result is |ψ1〉, particle B and particle E collapses to an entangled state
|φ〉BE = αa|00〉BE+βb|11〉BE. Bob applies U1 on particles B and m, then the
state of tripartite system BEm becomes
|φBEm〉 = 1√
2
[
b(α|00〉+ β|11〉)BE |0〉m + α
√
1− 2|b|2|00〉BE|1〉m
]
. (16)
If the result of Bob’s measurement on particle m is |0〉m, the subsystem
of particles B and E collapses to another entangled state |φ〉BE = α|00〉BE +
β|11〉BE . If Alice makes a measurement on particle E, Bob’s state randomly
collapses to corresponding |0〉B or |1〉B, which also violates the original in-
tention of OT. According to measurement result on particle E, Alice cannot
judge whether Bob receives the right message or not .
(E) relationship with no-go theorem
Here we discuss the relationship between the p-Rabin qubit-OT protocol
and no-go theorem. On one hand, the MLC no-go theorem[12] provides a strat-
egy to cheat the protocols such as BB84. In the p-Rabin qubit-OT protocol, the
quantum channel is securely pre-shared. If Alice’s target is to know whether
Bob gets the right qubit, such attack that has been discussed in (C) will fail.
On the other hand, Lo’s no-go theorem[13] provides a strategy to cheat the
protocols that satisfy definition 1. Corresponding to the related variable, the
i includes the qubit C and a BM result, meanwhile, the j is nothing in the
p-Rabin qubit-OT protocol. Thus, the p-Rabin qubit-OT protocol cannot be
viewed as the protocol in definition 1. The reasons are as follows (compare the
items one by one with those in definition 1).
(I) Alice inputs a qubit and a BM result, while Bob inputs nothing;
(II) Bob learns f(i, j) with probability 50% instead of certainty;
(III) Alice knows that the j is nothing;
(IV) Bob can learn part of the i, i.e. the BM result.
Definition 1 Ideal one-sided two-party secure computation
(I)Alice inputs i and Bob inputs j, then
(II) Bob learns f(i, j) unambiguously.
(III) Alice learns nothing about j and f(i, j).
(IV) Bob learns nothing about i more than what logically follows from the
values of j and f(i, j).
4 Conclusion
In this paper, by utilizing the property of PT, A typical PT [31] is used to
realize OT of a qubit from Alice to Bob. The p-Rabin qubit-OT protocol can
easily lead to a QOT of a classical bit by encoding classical bits 0 and 1 with
two orthogonal qubits, so a new idea is given to realize QOT. This research
may open a new perspective of OT.
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To analyze the security of the p-Rabin qubit-OT protocol, we prove that
the protocol satisfies the security requirements of a Rabin OT. Because the
kernel part of the protocol is PT, the concealingness and probabilistic transfer
is clear. To learn the information whether Bob receives the teleported state or
not, Alice may have three methods, one is to launch after BM and the other
two are to launch before BM:(1)In the opening phase, Alice tells Bob a fake
BM result in order to reduce the probability of Bob’s recovering the right state;
(2)Applying a unitary transformation on particle A for the purpose that she
can control the probability of Bob’s receiving the right state; (3) Introducing
an auxiliary qubit which is used to load and illustrate the information, so the
auxiliary qubit must correlate to the pre-shared |φ〉AB. In all, the analytic
results show that the p-Rabin qubit-OT protocol is unconditionally secure
against any cheating strategy. Finally, the discussion of the relationship with
the no-go theorem indicates the p-Rabin qubit-OT protocol is able to evade
the no-go theorem.
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